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Summary
The need for a pro-poor mode of irrigation
management transfer (IMT) has arisen due to the
observed tendency of IMT to aggravate rural
poverty.  This research, centered on large scale
canal irrigation schemes in India, seeks to:   a)
examine ways to measure relative income poverty
within large-scale irrigation schemes,  b) examine
the validity of the common assumption that both
poor and non-poor farmers of the same irrigation
scheme have equal access to canal water,  and
c)  assess the differential impacts of IMT
programs on poor and non-poor farmers in Andra
Pradesh and Gujarat, India.  Two different IMT
programs—the state-wide program under the
Andra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Irrigation
Systems Act of 1999 (APFMIS) and the pilot
program under the Participatory Irrigation
Management Resolution in Gujarat of 1995
(PIM)—were selected for this study. Seven
hundred land owning and tenant farmers from 7
water users’ associations (WUAs) constituted the
sample of “small farmers” and “larger farmers”
with operational holdings of less than one hectare
and one hectare or more, respectively.
Relative farm size was found to be a valid
indicator of relative income, as many features
characteristic of the farm size exert a determining
influence on income.  Moreover, the ready
availability of data on farm size makes it a
practical indicator.  In Andra Pradesh a higher
proportion of small farmers depend on canal
water but the concentration of their plots, mainly
in the tail ends,  poses a disadvantage regarding
canal water accessibility.  In contrast, no
differences in water accessibility exist between
small farmers and larger farmers in Gujarat.
Therefore, IMT that improves access to canal
water is pro-poor per se in Andra Pradesh and
equally beneficial to both small and larger farmers
in Gujarat.
Farmer participation in  WUA activities is
rather low in both states and most small farmers
are unaware of WUAs.  While small farmers often
participate in repair and rehabilitation work, the
larger farmers involve themselves  in meetings,
committees, etc.  Such inequity in participation
undermines the equitable distribution of benefits
from IMT and also the viability of WUAs that
depend heavily on the labor contribution of  small
farmers.  It is recommended that a one-farm  one-
vote right, irrespective of farm size, stipulated by
APFMIS, be concretized through awareness raising.
The impacts observed are from 5 years of
program implementation in Gujarat and 2 years in
Andra Pradesh.  The findings of this research
underscore the necessity for monitoring farm-size
related differences as a prerequisite for ensuring
pro-poor IMT.vi1
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especially poor people are reached and gain
from irrigation investments are also on the
agenda at the earliest stages of scheme
development. Targeting the poor by selecting
their lands for improvement or land redistribution
in the new command area and  allocating new
land primarily to the poor, are two possible
measures and they are essentially arranged
before construction (Chambers 1984; Jazairy et
al. 1992). Prevention of poor people’s loss of
land and water rights without proper
compensation is equally negotiated at the very
beginning. Another regulation that determines
poor people’s relative benefits, and is typically
decided upon in the early phases, is the
allocation of water rights. Allocation of such
rights in proportion to land size rather than, for
example, on the basis of an equal quantity of
water to every farm household, reproduces the
inequities of land distribution in the distribution
of water and water-created wealth.  Allocation
proportional to land size is widespread in
countries like India, which is the focus of the
present research.
1
Justification and Research Design
Justification
Poverty alleviation has always been an
important aim of  the governments of developing
countries when investing  in the construction
and operation of large-scale canal irrigation
infrastructure. Among the expected impacts are
benefits for  poor net food producers from more
intensive cropping of higher-yielding varieties
during a longer period of the year, including the
lean period. Urban and rural poor net food
buyers benefit from higher agricultural output
and lower food prices. New wage employment in
irrigated agriculture, construction work and the
increase of local demand for goods and
services as spin-off of irrigation development
would further benefit the rural poor.
These plausible, and partly verified, positive
impacts of irrigation on the income-poor are
realized when new schemes start functioning
and effecting a shift from rain-fed agriculture to
irrigated agriculture,  one crop per year to more
crops,  a low-value crop to a high-value crop,
etc. Therefore, targeted measures to ensure that
1In India, the proportionality of water rights to land size (and crops) is strong in formal and local law, like warabandi (a system of rotational turns
through which each shareholder in a watercourse obtains his or her water supply). This reproduces the skewed distribution of land in water use
and the distribution of wealth created with water. This proportionality is rarely questioned except for a few often-cited micro-scale experiments in
which the rightful quantity of water was disconnected from land size, for example in the Pani Panchayats in Pune (Chambers 1994), and sometimes
even from landownership, as in Sukhomajri (Sarin 1996). In the present research, the quantity of water was disconnected from land size in
Gujarat WUA1 during a short period of severe water scarcity, with support from an NGO.2
If the early phases of scheme development
are most critical to realize poverty alleviation
impacts, the question is, whether there are
irrigation policy-related poverty issues in the
use phase. Irrigation agencies concerned  with
poverty may, during the use phase, simply
concentrate on ensuring that the scheme
functions well and realizes its potential, while
water is allocated equitably. It is true that
localized measures during the use phase, such
as rehabilitation or drainage and salinization
management,  may still  be targeted at sites in
the scheme where a high proportion of poor
people depend upon irrigation. However, in
general, the working hypothesis that once a
scheme functions,  the scheme operation and
maintenance equally affects poor and non-poor
farmers and that inequities related to farm size
(and hence poverty) are a given which irrigation
agencies cannot change anymore seems
justified. An incidentally verified common
assumption that the poor are concentrated in
the tail ends as a consequence of poverty
cannot easily be changed either.  It only
underlines the urgency to address the general,
scheme-level head-tail inequities in water use in
order to reduce water scarcity which, in  turn,
tends to become an additional cause of poverty
in the tail ends. Even if sociopolitical and
economic power relations among farmers are
found to play a role in irrigation management at
all levels (Mollinga 1998) including negotiations
for water at farm level (Jairath 1999a; Raju
2000), they seem less relevant than general
scheme problems, unless social inequities are
huge,  as in feudal societies. The lack of tools
to monitor poverty dimensions in large-scale
canal irrigation schemes during the use phase
undoubtedly perpetuates the silence on
poverty—once schemes have started
functioning.
The working hypothesis that the interests of
the poor sufficiently overlap the general scheme
interests may have been valid in the past.
However, this could drastically change under
irrigation reform and IMT.  Since the mid-1980s,
hand-over of managerial and financial
responsibilities of the public schemes to newly
established water users associations (WUAs) in
return for stronger rights for farmers over water,
and in some cases also ownership of
infrastructure, has been intensified worldwide
(Vermillion,  1997). Evaluations of the early
experiences of  IMT increasingly indicate that
the current mode of IMT only works in respect
of  non-poor, market-oriented, large-scale and
business-like agriculture (Shah et al. 2002). This
is the case in countries like the USA and New
Zealand or on large farms in South Africa,
Mexico and Turkey. In schemes in the  middle-
and low-income countries with a heterogeneous
composition of farmers in the command areas,
IMT   succeeds only where farmers with the
largest holdings become the “champions,” for
example, in Colombia (Ramirez and Vargas
1999) or Sudan (Narayanamurthy et al. 1997).
For poorer farmers in Sudan, and indeed in
many smallholder irrigation schemes, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa, withdrawal of state
support led to partial or full collapse of the
scheme, with negative consequences on both
productivity and poverty. That pattern was
similar in Kenya (Kabutha and Mutero 2001),
Zimbabwe (Manzungu et al. 1999) and  South
Africa (Shah et al. 2002). Many current modes
of IMT aggravate rural poverty and jeopardize
original  government goals of irrigation investments.
Governments continue IMT in pursuit of the
originally expected goals of removing the
inefficiencies of costly state bureaucracies (or
just saving state funds) and intentions of better
tapping  local farmer knowledge, entrepreneurial
skills and their keen motivation to ensure
adequate water services. This  is also the
policy and practice of the government of India
(Brewer et al. 1999; Hooja and Joshi 2000).
Hence, the question is how future irrigation
management transfer can be done in a “pro-
poor” mode resulting in benefits to poor farmers,
while benefiting non-poor farmers equally or3
perhaps to a lesser degree.  The present
research addresses this issue.
Research Questions
First, the research aims to contribute to the
development of a poverty indicator  appropriate
not only  for use in the present research but
also for  use by the government staff, WUAs
and researchers for routine monitoring of
poverty dimensions in large-scale canal
irrigation schemes under IMT. An indicator
should facilitate the comparison of differential
impacts on poor and non-poor farmers within a
particular scheme at a certain moment and
identification of  trends overtime. Existing data
and registers should be used optimally. Farm
size fits these criteria best.   This research
further examines the relationship between farm
size and other intra-scheme variables that affect
farm incomes and income-poverty  in order to
validate and improve an indicator based on farm
size.  These are  the location of plots at  head
or tail ends, crop choice, cropping intensity and
the role of other income sources in farm
households.
Second, the research empirically tests the
above-mentioned hypothesis that irrigation
affairs in functioning large-scale canal irrigation
schemes, in particular access to water, affect
poor and non-poor farmers in the same scheme
alike, given land distribution, plot locations in
head or tail, and water allocation proportional to
farm size. Both canal water and water from
other irrigation sources, such as wells and
mechanized pumps, are considered. Where
systematic differences between poor and non-
poor farmers in their access to water are found
to exist, plausible implications for IMT are traced.
Last,  as the core of the research,
differential impacts of irrigation management
transfer programs in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat
on poor and non-poor farmers are examined.
Impacts of IMT with regard to access to water,
crop choice, newly irrigated area production and
incomes are analyzed and equities and
inequities of  participation in the new WUAs are
assessed.
Methodology
The research questions are addressed for
schemes under two different IMT programs, the
Andra Pradesh Farmers Management of
Irrigation Systems Act of 1997 (APFMIS)  and
the Government of Gujarat Resolution on
Participatory Irrigation Management 1995(PIM).
Worldwide, the innovative  “big-bang” approach
of APFMIS is seen as the most effective mode
of  IMT. The approach taken in Gujarat
represents the more conventional, step-by-step
pilot method, which has also been applied
elsewhere in India and other countries
(Parthasarathy 2000; Brewer et al. 1999). Both
programs are still young , only 2 years in Andra
Pradesh and 5 years in Gujarat.  Hence, effects
have not crystallized as yet, especially in Andra
Pradesh and the findings at this stage serve
rather as a baseline for continued impact
monitoring. More importantly, the assessment of
early impacts informs policy makers on time
about poverty impacts so that recommendations
to render the mode of IMT more ‘pro-poor’, if
needed, can still be implemented.
Seven newly established WUAs were
selected from the main agro-ecological regions
in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat. The three WUAs
in Andra Pradesh (Andra Pradesh WUA1, Andra
Pradesh WUA2 and Andra Pradesh WUA3) are
from the Telangana, Coastal and Rayalseema
regions respectively, and were chosen randomly
from the largest schemes in these regions. In
Gujarat, two WUAs were selected randomly
from the pilot PIM schemes in the dry north
Gujarat region (Gujarat WUA1 and Gujarat
WUA2) and two from the central south region
(Gujarat WUA3 and Gujarat WUA4). NGOs are
the implementing agencies of the two Northern4
WUAs while the governmental irrigation
department (ID) supports the southern WUAs.
The main characteristics of these WUAs are
listed in the annex.
The total sample consists of 700 farm
households operating holdings in the command
area of these WUAs during the year 1998–1999.
Further, in each WUA, committee members
totaling 67 were interviewed.  The selection of
the 700 farm households was stratified and
included landowners of four size classes of
operational holdings: less than 0.5 ha, from
0.5–1 ha,  from 1–2.5 ha  and above 2.5 ha.
A fifth category consisted of owner-cum-tenants
or tenants who cultivated leased-in land in the
command area and whose operational
landholding did not exceed one ha.
2 Female-
headed households were purposively included in
the study.
3 This sample allows identifying farm-
size-related patterns. As relevant,  the findings
are either presented for all farm classes or for
two main classes: the smallest three classes of
owners and tenants operating less than 1 ha
each are regrouped as “small farmers” (totaling
490) and the two categories with operational
holdings above 1 ha are regrouped into the
category of “larger farmers” (totaling 210).
Farm-size-related differences in access to
irrigation water were measured, first, by
assessing access to canal water and other
sources of irrigation by farm size. Second, the
number of waterings received from canals or
other irrigation sources for main crops in a
scheme were compared. In Andra Pradesh,
access to water was assessed for the kharif
(summer season) 1998–1999. In this state, the
irrigated area is generally the largest during this
season. In one WUA in the sample,  there is no
irrigation at all in rabi (winter season).  The
major crops found in the study of WUAs were
paddy and maize as predominant food crops
and cotton, chili and groundnut as cash crops.
In Gujarat, rabi (winter season) is the most
important season for irrigation;  so the rabi of
1998–1999 was analyzed. The major crops are
wheat and the cash crops,  mustard and
tobacco. Access to water was studied for the
910 plots in both states with these eight main
crops. For the assessment of effects of IMT on
access to water, other aspects such as the
quantities of water, timeliness and reliability of
water services as well as perceived changes in
productivity and incomes, for any of the plots,
were also included.
2These farm sizes fall within the relatively small farm sizes, for example, in Andra Pradesh where 97% of all irrigated farms are below 5 ha (FAO-
INPIM 2000).
3Results of the analysis of the gender aspects are reported elsewhere (van Koppen et al. 2000).
Poverty and Farm Size
rrigation schemes in India where land registers
already exist. Farm size is especially a valid
proxy for relative income and income poverty
within localized irrigation schemes where
relative farm size is a proxy for relative
incomes and relative poverty. Farmers in the
same scheme are more or less equally affected
The relationship between income poverty and
lack of land is well established and continues to
lead to poverty-focused land reforms (Sobhan
1993; Dev et al. 1994; World Bank 2000).
Hence, in an agriculture-based rural economy,
farm size is a valid proxy for income. It is also
a proxy for which data are available in many5
by other important variables that determine
incomes, such as access to markets, off-farm
employment opportunities, climate, etc.  So,
farm size is the most appropriate and the only
currently available indicator for routine
monitoring of poverty dimensions in irrigation
schemes. The question is whether and, if
possible, how the indicator can be further
improved. Therefore, we examined important
factors that influence the relationship between
farm size and income that may vary highly
within WUAs, such as location of the plot in the
head or tail and related land value, cropping
intensity, value of crops grown, and last but not
least, other household income sources than
irrigated agriculture. The assessment of whether
there is a positive, negative or neutral
relationship between farm size and these
variables led to the following conclusions.
Plot Location
Plots of small and larger farmers are not
scattered randomly throughout the command
area. Larger farmers appear to be
systematically more successful in occupying the
head and middle reaches and in avoiding tail
ends than small farmers. Tail ends are generally
assumed to be more disadvantageous. Figure 1
shows that, out of all plots belonging to small
farmers in Andra Pradesh, most (57%) are in
the tail ends, while the corresponding value for
larger farmers is 44 percent.   A similar bias is
observed in Gujarat where the plots of small
and larger farmers in the tail end are 38 percent
and 29 percent, respectively. This difference is
even more relevant because small farmers more
often depend only on one or two plots. As figure 2
indicates, in Andra Pradesh, the large majority
of the smallest farmers, with holdings of less
than 0.5 ha (86%) have only one plot each. In
Gujarat, where plots are generally smaller, the
risk of having only one plot in the tail end is
less—half of even the smallest farmers with
less than 0.5 ha, each have two plots or more.
Thus, small farm size is related to location in
the tail. This makes the relationship between
farm size and income stronger and farm size
more valid as a proxy.  Head-tail inequities in
Figure 1.
Proportion of plots by location and farm size.
Notes: Significance χ
2
              Andra Pradesh: Significant at 0.005 level.
              Gujarat: Significant at 0.005 level.6
water delivery are not just a general scheme
problem but they are a problem that affects
poorer farmers more than larger farmers. As a
consequence, in the WUAs of both states, IMT
that leads to better provision of canal water to
the tails would be “pro-poor” in itself as it
disproportionately benefits small farmers.
FIGURE 2.
Proportion of households by number of plots and farm size and tenancy status.
Crop Choice4
Systematic farm-size related differences  related
to crop choice were found in Andra Pradesh. As
figure 3 shows, a significantly higher proportion
of plots operated by small farmers (54%) are
cultivated with the low-value paddy crop, used
4Differential yields per unit of land and cropping intensities are not further considered here. The latter is of limited importance, because in six
WUAs the irrigated areas in the two irrigation seasons are comparable for both seasons. In one scheme there is only one kharif.
Notes: Significance χ
2
               Andra Pradesh: Paddy, among all crops: Significant at 0.005 level
                                            Chili, among cash crops: Significant at 0.01 level.
              Gujarat: Not significant.
FIGURE 3.
Proportion of plots by major crop and farm size.7
for family consumption and for the market, than
the plots cultivated by larger farmers (32%). As
for high-value cash crops, larger farmers
cultivate chili more often than small farmers
(19% versus 8%, respectively). In Gujarat, no
systematic relationships were found between
holding size and crop choice (wheat, mustard,
tobacco). This means that farm size is even
more strongly related to income in Andra
Pradesh but not in Gujarat.
Other Income Sources
Figure 4 highlights that the irrigated plots are
rarely the only income source, especially among
the smallest farmers. Even though the majority
of the farmers with holdings above 2.5 ha also
have more income sources, this finding implies
that caution is needed in equaling differences in
farm size to differences in income. Additional
information on the relative and absolute contribution
of these other income sources to total income and
income poverty would improve the indicator.
Insight into the source of other incomes
clarifies whether additional income is from
irrigated agriculture and hence indirectly related
to IMT, or not. Figure 5 shows that agriculture
and allied activities such as agricultural wage
labor and livestock, are the primary income
source for 91 percent of the sample households
in Andra Pradesh. In Gujarat, the rural economy
is less agriculture-based and off-farm
employment has become an important primary
income source. Among the households operating
holdings of less than 0.5 ha, 46 percent find
their major income outside agriculture, in regular
(non-agricultural) wage labor and self-
employment, and in trades such as  diamond-
cutting in areas like Visnagar, Surat.
The importance of agriculture in Andra
Pradesh is also reflected in the finding that
laborer is the main activity status of a
significant proportion of all members of
the poorest households in Andra Pradesh. Thus,
49  percent of all working  women and  33
percent of  the men in small tenants’
households  are  reported to be active as
casual agricultural wage laborers. Wage labor
provides the primary source of household
income in 33 per cent of all households and the
secondary source of income of another
FIGURE 4.
Proportion  of households with only one income source by farm size.8
24 percent of all households in Andra Pradesh.
In contrast, in farms up to one hectare in
Gujarat, less than 14 percent of all male
household members and less than 6 percent of
all women are agricultural wage laborers.
In Andra Pradesh, landlessness is
widespread, which explains not only the high
dependence on agricultural wage labor, but also
high tenancy rates. In Andra Pradesh WUA3, for
example, about 30 percent of the eligible
members of the WUA are reportedly tenants.
5 In
Gujarat, on the other hand, leasing in of  land
by poor people is rarely reported. On the
contrary, the incidence of reverse tenancy is
high, especially in the two WUAs where agriculture
is least important as an income base for the small
farmers. Farmers with very small smallholdings
lease their lands to large landowners.
In Andra Pradesh literacy rates are low. The
average percentage of literate persons in the
sample households is 49 percent for men and
25 percent  for women. In Gujarat, this is much
higher—69 percent  for men and
43 percent for women.
Conclusion
In both states, small farms are more often
located in the tail ends compared to larger
farms. In Andra Pradesh,  small farm size is
also related to the cultivation of low-value
crops. These relationships reinforce the validity
of farm size as a proxy for income poverty.
However, farm size and income diversification
are inversely related. Especially in very small
holdings, there is more often more than  just
one income source.  Thus,  in interpreting the
relationships between farm size and other
variables that are presented below,  one needs
to realize that the smallest farms are not
necessarily the most income-poor  in Gujarat.
More research is needed on the importance  of
other income sources, in respect of poverty
(cattle, wage-employment, number of earning
male/female household members, casual/
permanent employment, etc.).
Farm size is recommended for the routine
monitoring of income poverty dimensions in
large-scale canal irrigation schemes. The proxy
5In some coastal areas, more than 75% of the land is sharecropped (Raju 2000). The average percentage of tenants in irrigation in Andra
Pradesh is 13 according to FAO-INPIM (2000).
FIGURE 5.
Proportion of households with major income from agriculture.9
would improve if it was specified for variables
like location, crop choice, cropping intensity,
and, as elaborated in the next sections, access
to water and the WUA. However, the indicator
Access to Water
FIGURE 6.
Proportion of plots by WUA and source of irrigation.
would especially improve as a proxy for income
poverty if additional information on other income
sources were included.
It is commonly assumed that  important
features of  functioning canal irrigation schemes
such as access to water in the command area
are similar for poor and non-poor farmers, once
water allocation proportional to farm size and
skewed land distribution are accepted as a
given. The findings above already indicate that
in the sample WUAs there are systematic
differences in variables that indirectly affect
access to water, namely the concentration of
small farms in the tail ends and, in Andra
Pradesh, preference of small farmers for paddy,
a water-consuming crop. Other systematic
differences in access to water were found as
well, at least in Andra Pradesh.
Alternative Irrigation Sources
Before looking into farm-size related differences
in access to water, a general picture of the
importance of conjunctive use of water from
either canals or other sources is given. Of all
the sample plots, 51 percent in Andra Pradesh
and 62 percent in Gujarat are irrigated by
alternative sources of water. However, the
pattern strongly varies by WUA. Each state has
one WUA that still largely depends on canal
water only (figure 6). In Andra Pradesh,
alternative sources are shallow large-diameter
wells with mechanized pumps and tanks. In
Gujarat, they are primarily shallow wells with10
pumps. Deep tubewells are used only in Gujarat
WUA1, in the dry northern part of Gujarat,
where as many as 66 percent of the plots
surveyed are irrigated by tubewells or a
combination of tubewells and canal water.
Another 11 percent of plots in this WUA are
irrigated by shallow wells alone or in
combination with canals. In Gujarat WUA2, the
other WUA in the dry north, water provision in
32 percent of the plots is done by both  wells
and canals (but very few tubewells).
Remarkably, less than 7 percent of plots in all
five other WUAs are irrigated by a combination
of alternative sources and canals. Thus, most
plots in the sample depend  either on canal
water or, more often, on alternative sources of
water, but rarely on both.
The location of alternative irrigation sources
in the command area varies. In Andra Pradesh,
alternative sources are significantly more
prevalent in the head and middle reaches,
where 64 per cent of the plots depend upon
alternative sources. In the tail ends, this is 36
percent. In Gujarat, the alternative sources are
more towards the tail ends, where 69 percent of
the plots depend upon alternative sources. In
the upstream reaches this is less—59 percent
of the plots.
 For all crops, plots irrigated by alternative
irrigation sources received a higher number of
waterings than plots irrigated from canals.
Therefore, alternative irrigation sources perform
better (but tend to cost more). Expectedly, plots
that depend only on canal irrigation face more
problems in the tail.  For seven out of the eight
crops (except wheat in Gujarat) canal-irrigated
plots in the tails received less waterings than
those at the head. The picture is more mixed if
one compares the number of waterings from
alternative water sources either in the head,
middle or tail. For five of the eight crops, tail
enders get more waterings from alternative
sources than head enders.
Differential Access to Water
The first aspect of possible systematic
differences in access to water between small
and larger farmers concerns their access to
alternative irrigation sources. In Andra Pradesh
a significant bias was found. In this state only
46 percent of the plots of small farmers were
irrigated from alternative sources as against
56 percent of plots of larger farmers. In Gujarat,
there was no such difference. Among the plots
of small and larger farmers,  63  percent and
62 percent respectively were  irrigated from
alternative sources.
6
The second aspect analyzed is the number
of waterings received by small and larger
farmers either from canals or from alternative
sources. This highlighted important differences
in Andra Pradesh, as shown in figure 7. Those
small farmers with access to alternative
sources received less waterings from them than
larger farmers received for four of the five
crops. Remarkably, not only a higher  proportion
of small farmers use canal water, but they also
take more waterings than larger farmers
especially for paddy, their preferred crop, and
also for cotton. However, differences in the
number of waterings for the other cash crops do
not exist or point in the opposite direction.
Thus, in Andra Pradesh canal irrigation, which
is the cheapest water source, is in a sense, a
“small farmers’ affair.” Again, in Gujarat, there
are no systematic differences.
6No data are available on whether one has access to alternative sources as owner or as water buyer. Water buyers usually pay relatively high
water prices. The poor are typically buyers of water, because they cannot afford to buy mechanized irrigation equipment and become water
sellers (Shah 1993; Parthasarathy 1999).11
FIGURE 7.
Number of waterings received per plot by crop, source of irrigation, and farm size.
Tenants
In order to answer the question of whether
tenancy status of plots has an effect on access
to water, the judgement of farmers on whether
they received the number of waterings they had
thought was required for their plots was
examined—comparing leased-in plots and owned
plots. As figure 8 shows, a higher proportion of
respondents among small farms in both states
are satisfied with water delivery for plots
leased-in than for plots owned. This is the
reverse for larger farmers. A lower proportion of
larger farmers are satisfied for plots leased-in
than for owned plots. This may indicate that
small tenants are able to choose plots with a
satisfactory water supply. Larger farmers, on
the other hand, may have other reasons to
choose plots, i.e., bordering on their own land.
Whether IMT will negatively affect the
current satisfaction of small tenants needs to be
monitored. In the Gujarati law, tenants who lack
their own land in the command area have no
legal status as members of the WUA. In Andra
Pradesh the law recognizes them (see below).
Here the issue is that tenants may decline to
get registered as WUA members as this makes
their legal claims under state tenancy laws so
strong that owners may stop giving their lands
on lease to them.
Conclusions
In Andra Pradesh, canal irrigation tends to be
a “small farmers’ affair” in several respects. A
slightly higher proportion of small farmers than
larger farmers take water from canals, and
they take a greater number of waterings than
larger farmers, especially for paddy, a
preferred crop. The access of small farmers to
the generally better-performing alternative
Note: “N” indicates the total number of small and larger farmers.12
irrigation sources is less frequent than that of
larger farmers. Moreover, those small farmers
who have access to alternative irrigation
sources tend to get less waterings than the
larger farmers for most crops.  Moreover,
small farmers in Andra Pradesh who are
concentrated towards the tail ends, face the
problem of a lower number of waterings than at
the head reaches.  Also, access to alternative
sources of irrigation is less in the tail end,
compared to that of the middle and head
reaches.  Small farmers probably rely on canal
water because it is cheap.  They usually lack
the capital to invest in infrastructure or to
purchase water, even though the net benefits
would be higher.
The important implication for IMT is that
small farmers would benefit more than larger
farmers from improved canal irrigation
performance.  Their motivation to contribute to
this improvement is probably stronger as well,
which compounds their already strong stakes in
agriculture as a primary source of income. In
Andra Pradesh, therefore, any improvement in
access to canal water in general would be “pro-
poor” in itself and can count on the active
support of small farmers.   As a corollary,
modes of IMT that negatively affect the provision
of canal water would particularly hit the poor.
In Gujarat, access to alternative sources
and the number of waterings received from
alternative sources are generally equally spread
among small and larger farmers. Only the
irrigation costs from alternative sources may be
higher for small farmers. Although small farmers
are concentrated in the tail ends in Gujarat,
they take equal advantages from alternative
sources, which are widespread in the tails, even
more than in the other reaches.  Accordingly,
for the Gujarati WUAs, the assumption that
access to water in canal irrigation commands is
farm-size neutral, appears valid.
FIGURE 8.
Proportion of plots without difficulties in access to water, by tenancy status and farm size.
Notes : Significance χ 2
                 Andra  Pradesh,owned plots: Significant at 0.05 level.  Plots leased-in, total:  Not significant.
                 Gujarat, plots leased-in: Significant at 0.025 level. Owned plots, total: Not significant.13
Impact of IMT on Access to Water
Characteristics of IMT in the Two
States
The two IMT programs selected for this study
are the state-wide project under the Andra
Pradesh Farmers Management of Irrigation
Systems Act of 1997 (APFMIS) and the scheme
under the Government of Gujarat Resolution on
Participatory Irrigation Management 1995 (PIM)
(Parthasarathy 2000). In Gujarat, either the
Irrigation Department (ID) or an NGO acts as
the implementing agency in the pilot projects
functioning under the schemes. As table 1
summarizes, the populist reform of Andra
APFMIS PIM
Scale All systems 12,292 WUAs 13 pilot WUAs
Tiers WUA at lowest tier, Distributary Committees WUA at lowest tier only
(DCs) at next level, and Project Committee (PC)
at main system level
Implementer ID and District Administration ID or NGO
Membership in Stipulated in APFMIS Act—all land users and Voluntary—landowners as ‘shareholders’;
command areas owners, if title is recorded or can be shown7 shares at nominal rates
Members’ rights Stipulated in APFMIS Act: one vote per farmer Cooperative law: if committee
to elect president and one vote to elect elections are held, usually
territorial committee member; right one vote per farmer
of recall of president
Formation of WUAs Statewide by District Collectors in April 1997,  Voluntary, upon registration as cooperative
either by election or by consensus-based
appointment of presidents and territorial committee,
WUA presidents elected DCs Committees
in November 1997,  PCs not formed yet
R&R Statewide,  all tiers 13 pilot WUAs
Subsidies R&R Fixed grants/ha, fivefold increase with IMT to Need-based grants up to
Rs 250/ha,8 financed by the World Bank Rs 500/ha  financed by the state
Identification and WUA participates in joint survey,  ID authorizes WUA participates in joint survey,
implementation of R&R and disburses funds to WUA, WUA ID approves, WUA implements
implements (no contractor)
Setting of rates and Rates tripled, revenue department still collects WUA sets rates, collects fees,
collection of fees fees as part of land tax,  fee recovery and R&R and hands 50% of fees over to ID,
grants will be connected, land tax will be delinked if paid in time
from water fees, so WUA will set, collect and partly
manage fees
Water distribution ID, as before IMT (rotation, below outlet locally),  Higher tiers: ID and WUA to fill/collect forms
in future stronger accountability of ID staff (sejhpali). Lowest tier—WUA.
for water distribution to WUA, DC and PC
TABLE 1.
Main characteristics of IMT programs in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat.
7As stipulated in the Amendment through Andhra Pradesh Legislative Bill no. 32 of November 1998: “any person who is in lawful possession
and enjoyment of the land under a water source, on proof of such possession and enjoyment in a crop year, may claim membership notwithstanding
whether he is a recorded landholder or not” (Rao et al. 1999).
8In 1998, US$1.00=Indian Rs 40.14
Pradesh is unique in its massive scale.  It
encompasses all irrigation systems in the state
and includes all tiers in the schemes. The legal
framework has, in one stroke, accommodated
all relevant aspects of farmers’ empowerment,
including quite strong rights for tenants.  The
organizational structure of the civil service,
rather than NGOs or the ID, was and still is
used for institution building.
9 Immediately after
its adoption, district collectors arranged the
election or appointment of committee members
for 5 years, statewide. This was accompanied
by large publicity campaigns and training
programs, with strong political support from the
highest levels. The World Bank co-funded a
massive operation of repair and rehabilitation
(R&R) that started 4 months after the elections
(Raju 2000). Funds for construction were
directly channeled to the new WUAs avoiding ID
staff costs and the costs on contractors. This
smart channeling raised the amounts available
on the ground even more, and also fostered
eagerness of farmers to repair “their” schemes
(Raju 2000). Water fees are still set by the
government (tripled just before adoption of the
Act) and the revenue department continues fee
collection, as part of the land tax. The ID
continues to handle water distribution, which is
by rotation in Andra Pradesh.
In contrast, in the conventional approach in
13 pilot schemes in Gujarat, transfer of water
management and cost recovery are already in
progress. The new WUAs, formed under the
guidance of either an NGO or the ID, are in the
process of being empowered to set fees, for
other purposes and to distribute water at the
lowest tier of their WUA. The new obligations
include filling and collecting demand forms, as
required in the sejhpali system in Gujarat, and
collection of fees and partial handover to the ID.
The pilot schemes are scattered and federation
with adjacent blocks into higher tiers is neither
foreseen nor possible in the short term. In both
states, the canals remain government property
and major rehabilitation continues to be the
responsibility of the IDs in the long run.
Improved access to water was an important
objective of the APFMIS Act and the Gujarat
PIM Resolution. Up till now repair and
rehabilitation (R&R) work constituted the most
important means of reaching this objective in
both states. R&R included earth work, removal
of shrubs and weeds, desilting and lining of
canals, pitching, repair and construction of
various structures and placing of pipelines and,
in some cases, closing of illegal outlets.
Moreover, in Andra Pradesh, access to water
could also be improved by the new option, at
least in theory, for farmers to communicate with
one another through the Distributary Committees
and also with the higher ID staff at distributary
level. In Gujarat, on the other hand, once
irrigation management is handed over, WUAs
themselves are entitled only to distribute water
that the ID delivers at the intake. Formal
handover had taken place in two WUAs of this
study, Gujarat WUA1 and Gujarat WUA4.
Access to Water
Figure 9 presents the proportion of households
that perceived improvements in access to canal
water after IMT.  Improved access to water
since IMT was reported by both small and
larger farmers  in tail, middle and head reaches
of the command areas. However, the variation
between WUAs was strong. The highest
proportion of households with a positive
evaluation (46%) is in Gujarat WUA1, where the
support by an NGO has been exceptionally
intensive (Parthasarathy and Iyengar 1998).
Mainly it is this exceptional result that renders
the average of Gujarat (25%) higher than that of
Andra Pradesh (15%). Apparently,
9Bruns (1999) highlights the global uniqueness of bypassing the vested interests of the ID by taking the route of regional and local administration.15
Extension of Irrigated Area
Among all respondents in the sample, 2 percent
in Andra Pradesh and 3 percent in Gujarat,
reported an increase in the area under
cultivation due to R&R work. The average size
of land gained was 0.66 ha per farmer in Andra
Pradesh and 1.1 ha per farmer in Gujarat. The
few newly irrigated plots were both in the head
and tail reaches and among both small and
larger farmers.
It was difficult to obtain scheme-level
aggregate data of extended area in Andra
Pradesh because, before APFMIS, the revenue
department tended to underreport irrigated
areas. When the grants for R&R became
proportional to reported irrigated areas, farmers
who have better knowledge, often suggested
adaptations. For example, the official figure in
Andra Pradesh WUA2, which is an increase of
2,000 ha, is probably so high because of these
effects. According to the president of Andra
Pradesh WUA2, 806 ha out of which 766 ha
FIGURE 9.
Proportion  of households reporting  better access to canal water due to WUA.
implementation by an NGO is not a sufficient
reason in itself, because the same NGO was
the implementing agency in Gujarat WUA2,
where the reported rate of improvement is one
but the lowest.
The low improvement in Andra Pradesh
WUA1, by only 7 percent as reported,  is partly
because the main canal was still under
construction. Andra Pradesh WUA3 is located in
the tail end of a system, where water does not
reach, even after R&R. Andra Pradesh WUA2,
with the highest improvement reported (28%)
lies in the coastal area, where improvements
are generally considerable
(Raju 2000).
Cropping Pattern, Yields, Incomes
When asked about changes since IMT, none of
the respondents reported “higher yields” and
“improved incomes,” nor reported changes in
cropping patterns due to better water availability.16
belonging to a state agricultural experiment
farm, have been added. In Andra Pradesh
WUA1, 42 ha were added.
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Aggregate data for the whole scheme in the
Gujarat WUAs showed small extensions. In
Gujarat WUA1, one group of farmers on about 9
ha who had  never received water earlier,
benefited from the repair of the underground
tubewell pipeline. The first R&R work was
undertaken in the lands of the high caste Patel
community and the next effort involved a
significant number of lower caste Thakore
farmers. In Gujarat WUA3, earthen canals were
cemented but this work was completed only in
those parts of the canal where the WUA
president and committee members had land.
This added 21 ha of irrigable land. Farmers
from another distributary strongly complained
that they had been left out in the joint survey
and that water still failed to reach their plots
and also that there was no response to their
complaints. These examples highlight inequities
intrinsic in the adopted mode of IMT in which
setting of priority for R&R work can easily be
dominated by the stronger sections of society
who secure leadership positions, apparently
without much accountability to members.
Higher-tier Negotiations in Andra Pradesh
A distinctive feature of APFMIS is that it
facilitates higher-tier organization and
information on, for example, irrigation schedules
and, in the long run, on negotiations of water
distribution between head enders and tail
enders. However, it was only in one WUA
distributary committee that the president had
informed the presidents of the WUAs under his
jurisdiction about water availability and rotation
schedules.
11
Cost Recovery and Water Distribution in
Gujarat
As process documentation showed
(Parthasarathy 1999), the collection of water
charges from  farmers has been difficult for the
president of one of the two Gujarat WUAs to
which management has been transferred in
Gujarat WUA4.  The command area of this
WUA covers 12 villages. With little support from
the committee members, the president and one
employee of the WUA had made a number of
visits to some of the villages to recover water
charges. Since the WUA could not collect the
water charges in time, the president, on several
occasions had paid the amount with his own
money to take advantage of the rebate (50% of
the total water charges) given by the ID to the
WUAs for timely payment. The new right of
water distribution at the lowest tier requires
considerable organization as well. The secretary
of the Gujarat WUA4 is now authorized to
remove the illegal “headings” by which farmers
block the canal to lead water into their fields.
Once a week, the WUA president makes
himself available to the farmers for sorting out
issues relating to water distribution and the
WUA. This was appreciated and a high
proportion of farmers (33%)  reported improved
access to water in this WUA, as shown in
figure 9.
The Gujarat WUA1, guided by the NGO,
used its new water rights to introduce a new
rotation during the first excessively dry year
10As Jairath (1999a) noticed, changes in the records of the revenue department and ID are difficult to interpret because they do not clarify the
“quality of irrigation.” Once water touched the tail—after 15 years—the amount of water and the irrigated area were found to be entered in the
records but it is yet to be seen what this means for the user.
11Raju (2000) reports effective communication in the case of a WUA in Andra Pradesh, which saved water during kharif and, for the first time,
allocated water during rabi. Jairath (1999b) also observes better interaction between farmers and the ID to “get the message through.”17
when water scarcity was severe. Under this
schedule, each farmer got water for one acre,
irrespective of the total farm size. This
ensured a minimum supply of water for all,
before the remaining water was allocated to the
larger water consumers. This, besides the R&R
work, contributed to the high proportion  of
farmers reporting “improved access to water”
as shown in figure 9. This WUA1 also used its
new freedom to raise water charges by four
times its original fee. However, protests among
the committee members and farmers led to a
reduction again to 150 percent of the government
water rates (for details see Parthasarathy
1999; 2000).
Conclusion
In sum, IMT in Andra Pradesh and Gujarat,
respectively, led to:
• improved access to water for 15 percent
and 25 percent of the respondents, and
• extension of irrigated area for 2 percent
(average 0.66 ha) and 3 percent  (1.1 ha) of
the respondents.
These early gains reported by the
respondents were independent of  farm size.
However, qualitative scheme-level information
highlighted that WUA leaders imposed their
personal choice with regard to the priority of
sites for R&R.
In interpreting the above, it should be borne
in mind that the reported impact in Andra
Pradesh, if extrapolated, would apply to more
than 10, 000 other WUAs. In this light, changes
in Andra Pradesh become significant indeed.
Moreover, these achievements are only the first
step and further transfer of financial and water
management from the ID to water users from
the lowest to the highest level is still to come,
as stipulated in APFMIS. On the other hand, the
benefits from the execution of long over-due
repairs and maintenance are “easy gains.”  The
pace of improvements risks slowing down.
Moreover, it is uncertain whether the heavy
subsidies will remain available, and  if not, what
farmers’ own labor and cash contributions for
R&R work will be (Jairath 1999a).
In Gujarat,  slightly better average results
are concentrated in one WUA where drought
and water scarcity problems were serious and
where the NGO had made considerable efforts.
The overall results took  4-5 years and can only
be extrapolated for 13 pilot projects.
Replication at a larger scale will require
considerable human and other resources.
Moreover, the design of PIM in Gujarat does not
foresee federation into higher levels. Thus, the
transfer of critical tasks, such as head-tail
inequities, is not on the agenda. In the Gujarat
WUAs, farmers more or less welcome the new
rights to manage water autonomously below the
outlet. However, the new obligations to collect
demand forms and fees represent a serious
extra burden for the irrigation committee
members. Whether WUAs are willing, and
equipped, to carry out the revenue functions is
a question yet to be answered.
To conclude, in both states, IMT has
improved access to water to a lesser or greater
extent and in a manner that was fairly neutral of
farm size, despite incidental signs of self-
interests of elite committee members. In both
states it is still an open question whether and
how self-management at the lowest levels will
become sustainable. Much will depend on the
viability of the new institutional arrangements of




Proportion of households unaware of the WUA, by farm size.
Notes:  Significance χ 2
              Andra Pradesh: WUA1, WUA2, total: Significant at 0.005 level. WUA3: Not significant,
              Gujarat: WUA2: Significant at 0.05 level, WUA3, WUA4: Not significant.  Total: Significant at 0.025 level.
In Andra Pradesh, the creation of  WUAs
started with the statewide elections or
appointments by consensus of committee
members, who then took the process forward.
In Gujarat, the local NGO or the ID staff got the
involvement of some active farmers,  to
convince fellow farmers in the command area to
join as shareholders.
Awareness
The evident minimal condition for participation is
awareness about the very existence of a WUA.
It is evident from figure 10 that many respondents
are still  completely unaware of the existence of
a WUA. Lack of awareness among respondents
is higher in Andra Pradesh (52%) than in
Gujarat (22%). As expected, awareness was
highest in Gujarat WUA1 (93%), where the NGO
had strongly intervened.   However, the shorter
time span in Andra Pradesh played a role here.
Moreover, the average area covered by one
WUA in Andra Pradesh (1,342 ha) is much
larger than that in Gujarat (180 ha) (see annex).
However, extrapolated to the whole state of
Andra Pradesh, the creation of awareness
among half of the irrigating farmers about
completely new forms of management is a
noteworthy achievement. The generally stronger
stakes of farmers in agriculture in Andra
Pradesh than in Gujarat may also have
contributed to the spreading of the news.
Significantly, throughout the WUAs and
states, a high proportion of small farmers are
unaware of the WUAs. Small farmers who have
never heard of the WUA are 58 percent in
Andra Pradesh, about double the proportion of
larger farmers which is 31 percent.  The
proportion of small farmers unaware of the WUA
is lower in Gujarat, (26% ) , but this is also
about double the percentage of larger farmers19
still uninformed (14%). In some WUAs of each
state the difference is small. For example,
almost all  the farmers are aware of the WUA in
Gujarat WUA1, but in Andra Pradesh WUA3,
farmers (whether small or larger) are not aware
of the WUA. The president of this WUA which
is  situated at the tail of the large scheme, does
not ask the farmers in the tail reaches further
downstream to contribute to R&R or other WUA
activities as water would still not reach them. In
other cases, there is a considerable gap in
awareness between small and larger farmers
within the same WUA. In the Andra Pradesh
WUAs, the gap is largest in WUA1, where 51
percent of the small farmers have not heard of
the WUA, while the corresponding figure for
larger farmers is only 6 percent. This WUA has
a female president.
12 The gap in Gujarat is
widest in WUA4 which covers over 12
villages—67 percent of the small farmers
versus 17 percent of the larger farmers are
unaware of the WUA. The gap in Gujarat
WUA2, the other WUAs with NGO support,
shows that NGOs per se can neither create
higher awareness in general, nor necessarily
reach poor farmers better.
Member Participation in WUA
Activities
Figure 11 summarizes the proportion of
respondents actively involved in the various
activities of the WUA. In spite of the higher
12There are female presidents in 98 WUAs in the whole state (Shyamala and Rao 1999).
FIGURE 11.
Proportion of households participating in WUA activities, by farm size.
Notes: n.a. = not applicable.
             Significance χ 2
              Andra Pradesh: Meetings: Significant at 0.005 level. Labor input: Significant at 0.025 level.
             Gujarat: Meetings: Significant at 0.005 level. Joint survey, supervision of labor: Not significant.
             Attendance at meetings by different categories of  larger farmers.
            Gujarat :                 farm size 1–2.5 ha = 28%     farm size > 2.5 ha = 40%
             Andra Pradesh:   farm size 1–2.5 ha = 31%     farm size > 2.5 ha = 18%20
rates of awareness in Gujarat, the overall rates
of active participation in institution building,
R&R, water distribution and fee collection are
generally similar in both states. The highest rate
of participation in annual meetings is found in
Gujarat, which is 22 percent of the sample
households. The findings are differentiated for
activities with high participation rates.  In all
WUAs, larger farmers dominate in meetings.
However,  in both states, small farmers
participate relatively more often than larger
farmers in the R&R work, including the joint
survey. Thus, most small farmers aware of the
WUA also participate in the WUA work but not
in decision-making.
A very active involvement of tenants in
Andra Pradesh is noticeable. The proportion of
tenants contributing labor to R&R work is the
highest of all (27%), whereas only 16 percent of
small landowning farmers and 9 percent of
larger farmers do so. Their attendance at
meetings is similar to that of the farmers with
equally small holdings (9%). In contrast, tenants
in Gujarat are virtually inactive in the WUA.
Even in Gujarat WUA1, only two tenants
participated in R&R work but they did not attend
meetings. So, although the formal position of
tenants in the new Andra Pradesh WUAs may
be slightly weaker than that of  landowners,
their involvement in meetings and especially in
R&R, is relatively strong. Tenant participation is
weak in Gujarat where they have no formal
status.
These findings underscore the essential
contribution of small farmers and, in Andra
Pradesh, especially of small tenants to the
upkeep of  infrastructure. Their strong stakes in
irrigated agriculture and higher dependency on
canals are probable reasons. This implies that
their continued support is important for
sustainable self-management. In that light, the
much more limited participation of small farmers
in meetings is likely to become a major
obstacle against their continued support.  Their
limited participation denies them many benefits
like information sharing, for example, on water
schedules upstream and within the scheme.
Furthermore, their voices are not heard in
decision making, which ultimately shapes the
gains they receive.
Committees
Committee members are virtually always larger
farmers.
13 It was learnt that in the first elections
in Andra Pradesh in 1997, for president and
representative positions of the different
territories within the WUAs, candidates
sometimes spent up to Rs 50,000, an amount
only affordable to better-off households. These
positions may be attractive because they
enhance conspicuousness and help in a political
career, although many farmers claimed that
party politics did not play any role. Finally,
given that substantial amounts are available for
R&R, these positions make it possible to
propose oneself or one’s relatives and friends to
replace the contractors appointed by the ID. A
new generation of “president-contractors” may
have been created (Raju 2000).
14
 Under the PIM program in Gujarat, the
implementing agencies largely controlled the
composition of committees through their
motivation efforts. After 4 to 5 years of
implementation, these efforts were still found to
be confined to the wealthier sections of society.
This pattern was sharply discernible in Gujarat
WUA1 and Gujarat WUA3 where the motivation
process was limited to better-off Patel
13Jairath (1999b) found that out of 28 WUA presidents 14% have less than 1 ha each, 22% between 1 and 2.5 ha while 64% have more than
2.5 ha. Given the average irrigated holding size of 0.88 ha in Andra Pradesh, the domination of large farmers is evident.
14It is estimated that around 30-40% of the WUA presidents have been involved in construction works as contractors (Raju 2000).21
community members, ignoring other castes. The
formal rule is that command area farmers elect
committee members and that they, in turn, elect
among themselves the office bearers consisting
of a chairman, a secretary and a treasurer.
Usually, constituent villages are also
represented. However, in reality, genuine
elections are rarely held.
An overview of  the committee members’
participation in the various WUA activities is
given in figure 12. The degree of participation in
Andra Pradesh is generally higher than in
Gujarat, especially in R&R. The involvement of
committee members in Andra Pradesh in water
distribution is high (58%). This may reflect a
partial overlap between the new WUA committee
and the existing local water distribution
arrangements in Andra Pradesh where, below
the outlet, a Neeruganti (a paid local person)
distributes water under the supervision of a
Calava Pedda (an elected, unpaid authority). In
fact in Andra Pradesh WUA3, some traditional
local office bearers observing that funds were
flowing to the WUA, started demanding
remuneration from the government for their work.
15
Conclusions
What is called a “WUA”  in reality is first and
foremost  a handful of local elite who facilitate
the beneficial implementation of state-initiated
and funded R&R work. In Gujarat, these
leaders are also in the process of undertaking
water allocation, distribution and fee
collection, which are cumbersome tasks the
government would like to hand over. A half of
the supposed constituencies of the WUAs in
15Raju (2000) observed the following reaction of some local water distributors vis-à-vis the flow of money for the establishment of the new WUA,
“Then, let the WUA president and TC members do all.”
FIGURE 12.
Proportion of committee members participating in WUA activities.22
Andra Pradesh and a quarter in Gujarat are
unaware of the existence and the purpose of
WUAs. Being informed is definitely related to
larger farm size. In spite of the higher level of
unawareness in Andra Pradesh, actual
participation rates are comparable and equally
low in both states.  Relatively higher levels of
participation in R&R work and the joint survey
were found among small farmers—this is even
more true for tenants than for landowning small
farmers. However, in all WUAs small farmers
participate considerably less in meetings than
larger farmers, while they rarely become
committee members. This domination of the new
‘WUAs’ by local elite is also reported elsewhere
(Jairath 1999b; Raju 2000).
Recommendations  for Pro-Poor  IMT
of IMT that benefits small farmers is the key to
the viability and sustainability of the WUA, in
addition to being a measure for poverty
alleviation.
The major weakness of APFMIS from both
viability and equity perspectives,  is small
farmers’ serious lack of information about the
WUA and their relative absence from
committees and general meetings, where crucial
benefits are to be realized. Thus, small farmers
are excluded from information, decision-making
and negotiation with leaders regarding spending
of government grants or site selection for R&R
and future self-management of water and cost-
recovery. By law, APFMIS contains all elements
of a pro-poor mode of IMT. It vests well-defined
rights in members for electing leaders and to
hold them accountable. Small farmers have
strong formal voting rights because rights are
irrespective of farm size. Moreover, APFMIS
stipulates potentially effective election
procedures.  Therefore, the most important and
globally unique chance to substantially improve
small farmers’ inclusion in the WUAs,  in order
to concretize these rights better than in the
past, will be the elections for new presidents
and territorial committee members. In the
forthcoming publicity campaigns, state policy
makers and the civil service should better
inform poor farmers about their rights than
The present research shows that there are
systematic poverty-related differences in
functioning large-scale canal irrigation schemes
in the WUAs in Andra Pradesh. In this state,
canal irrigation tends to be a “poor man’s affair.”
Small farmers use more water because they
cultivate paddy more often than larger farmers.
They face more problems in accessing water,
as their plots are concentrated in the tail ends,
unlike those of larger farmers. Small farmers
have less access to  generally better-performing
alternative irrigation sources, receive less
waterings and, as buyers, tend to pay a higher
price for water from alternative sources. As a
result, they rely more often on cheap canal
water than larger farmers and take more
waterings per crop from canals than larger
farmers. Lastly, in the virtual absence of non-
agricultural employment in Andra Pradesh, small
farmers depend heavily on irrigated agriculture
for the production on their own plots, leasing-in
land and agricultural wage employment.
Therefore, APFMIS, which in its first two years
of implementation led to general improved
access to water, is in itself pro-poor. The labor
contribution made by small farmers and tenants
to R&R to realize the benefits are considerably
higher than those of better-off farmers. This
implies that if R&R is to continue, possibly
without the current subsidies, a pro-poor mode23
during the hasty elections in 1997. Moreover,
rather than rewarding for consensus,
16 the
promotion of contest between several
candidates and the election of the most favored
renders the elections more transparent. This
benefits those who are still least aware of
WUAs—small farmers.
In contrast, in Gujarat, the hypothesis was
confirmed that there are no systematic
differences between small and larger farmers in
a) the choice for cash and food crops, b)
access to alternative irrigation sources, except
water costs and c) in the number of waterings
from either canals or other sources. Although
small farmers were found to be concentrated in
the tail ends, their dependency on canal water
is mitigated because alternative sources abound
in Gujarat, especially in the tail reaches. Lastly,
irrigated agriculture is less central for the
incomes of almost half of the smallest farmers
who are engaged in off-farm employment. So,
PIM would serve all farmers’ interests alike.
However, while it was found that both small and
larger farmers benefited from the impacts of
R&R, PIM also introduced new inequities in
awareness and decision-making in the WUAs. As
in Andra Pradesh, this may have long-term
negative impacts on equity, and perhaps also on
the viability of PIM. In the pilot WUAs the already
crystallized inequities are probably difficult to
redress. If PIM is newly introduced elsewhere,
information provision and inclusion of all farmers
need strong attention from the start onwards.
Another important issue in assessing the
impact of IMT on poverty alleviation concerns
the scale. To what extent can the findings of
the sample WUAs be extrapolated in space
and in time? APFMIS is clearly superior in
both respects. APFMIS is state-wide from the
start onwards. The past implementation of the
first steps at the lowest tiers created massive
momentum, which forms a sound basis for the
planned next steps: the organization of
farmers at higher tiers and complete hand-
over. In contrast, a program focusing only on
the lowest tiers such as PIM in Gujarat
(which, moreover, in its pilot-phase only
selected few scattered schemes) is limited by
design in its potential for vertical upscaling
overtime.
In sum, irrigation management transfer, or
more precisely its R&R component has short-
term benefits for all farmers in a scheme,
including, if not especially, poor farmers.
However, long-term benefits of irrigation
management transfer for poor farmers and
the viability of hand-over itself are at risk
because of serious inequities in the new
WUAs. Better inclusion of the poor in
information and decision-making flows for
sustainable poverty alleviation requires, in
any case, systematic monitoring of key
scheme variables and IMT variables by farm
size, which is rather easy, or by income,
which is more accurate but also more time
consuming.
16In 1997, Rs 50,000 was awarded to presidents who were unanimously appointed, without elections, and only Rs 30,000 when there was a
contest between several candidates.24
Annex
Characteristics of the study of WUAs.
States/details Gujarat Andra Pradesh
WUA WUA1 WUA2 WUA3 WUA4 WUA1 WUA2 WUA3
village(s) Thalota Laxmipura Tranol Digas  Ellabotharam Peddapala- Jantaluru
kaluru
Canal scheme Dharoi Dantiwada Mahi Kadana Ukai- Kakrapar Sriramsagar Nagarjunasagar Cuddapah -
Karnool and
Tungabhadra
Region Mahesana Patan Anand Bharuch Telangana Coastal Rayalseema
Water supply Scarce Scarce Perennial Perennial Scarce Other Scarce
Main irrigation
season Rabi Rabi Rabi Rabi Kharif Kharif Kharif
Two main crops Wheat Mustard Tobacco Sugarcane Paddy Cotton Groundnut
Mustard Wheat Wheat Wheat Maize Chili Paddy
Command area (ha) 224 246 356 921 464 2,600 1,369
Number  of villages/
territories 1 2 1 12 4 12 12
Number  of WUA
members 210 174 168 169 500 2,325 1,200
Implementing agency NGO NGO ID ID ID ID ID
• Andra Pradesh WUA1: Female President.
No water supply in 1998–99 due to repairs.
R&R work done under different programs
like Jhanmabhoomi. Voluntary labor for R&R
work reported.
•    Andra Pradesh WUA2: Many villages and
large command area. Mini-dams upstream
for power generation affect water flow.
WUA helped to improve water supply.
• Andra Pradesh WUA3: Many villages. Lack
of water in tail ends. Jail authorities
upstream illegally appropriate water.
Traditional water distribution practices
observed.
Particulars
• Gujarat WUA1: 5 tube well companies
operate in the village. People contributed to
R&R work.
• Gujarat WUA2: Only one watering in 1998–
99 but none in 1999–2000. People
contributed to R&R work.
• Gujarat WUA3: Seepage of earthen
watercourses. Waterlogging and
inaccessibility of tail ends. People
contributed to R&R work.
• Gujarat WUA4: Excess water and
waterlogging, lack of drainage.25
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